Iran stars: #FreeIran Opposition

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Trump, Nikki Haley can punish Iran without ending nuclear dea

According to reports, UN Amb. Nikki Haley suggested Congress might have a role in having the final say on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. She found a way for President Trump to say Iran is not complying without immediately killing the accord. Just as he punted the ball to Capitol Hill on the “Dreamers,” Haley is allowing Trump to do likewise on the nuclear deal.

Although the president has said Tehran is technically abiding by its commitments, Haley raised critical issues about the accord. By doing so, she gave Trump support if he decides to decline certifying Tehran in the future. According to reports, on the afternoon of Sep. 14, the president extended sanctions relief to Iran, avoiding imminent action that might implode the landmark 2015 nuclear deal.

One possible downside of failing to certify is it might set in motion another nuclear crisis alongside the one with North Korea. Another consequence is that it might cause a rift with key allies. French President Emmanuel Macron already said there was no alternative to the nuclear deal. Despite risks, the Haley option of allowing Trump to say Iran is not complying without killing the accord is the optimal choice.

Stories behind the Story

In an email sent to his list on Aug. 16, Omri Ceren, senior adviser at the Israel Project, discussed two “buckets” about whether Trump will decertify the Iran deal in October.

Bucket one is about policy: There are arguments for why the president would be substantively justified in decertifying. Trump has said Iran’s behavior justifies decertification, which could be done based on any of four conditions in the relevant Corker-Cardin law.

Bucket two is about politics: Trump might not decertify, despite substantive justifications. Per several reports, Iran deal advocates inside the State Department have launched multiple, open-ended initiatives around the deal, allowing them to argue decertification is diplomatically premature.

This AP story is a “bucket one” story, about Iran’s behavior for decertification. The nuclear accord triggers two Corker-Cardin conditions of decertification. The first requires a president to certify “Iran is transparently, verifiably, and fully implementing the agreement, including all related technical or additional agreements.” A related agreement is UNSCR 2231. It locked in the Iran accord at the UN and calls upon Iran “not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”

The Obama administration considered ballistic missile development “inconsistent with and “in defiance of” the resolution. But the Trump State Department described a December 2016 launch as a full-blown “violation” of the resolution. The Obama administration assumed the Iran deal would modify Tehran’s behavior in the direction of becoming more moderate over time, per VOA. Yet that appears not to be the case as the AP suggeststhat money is being funneled to Iran’s ballistic missile and terrorist activities, opposite U.S. national interests.

In a pushback against U.S. sanctions on Iran, AP reported that Tehran’s parliament voted on Aug. 13 to increase spending on its ballistic missile program and operations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, (IRGC), a sanctions bill mirroring a new U.S. law targeting Iran.

While Washington offered hundreds of millions of dollars in new funding for infrastructure projects and related nonmilitary ones, Tehran usedAmerica’s own tactics against it.

Iran’s parliament bill includes banning visas for U.S. officials involved with the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); the largest unit is People’s Mojahedin of Iran (PMOI)/Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK). Prominent U.S. lawmakers, former military officials, and politicians have met with the NCRI and spoken at its rallies.

For instance, I spoke at a rally of 2,000 NCRI members in Albania on Sep. 5, and plan to speak at a rally against Iran’s President Rouhani on Sep. 20, to conduct interviews, which the author also conducted in Tirana. I interviewed incoming PMOI/MEK Secretary General Zahra Merrikhi and queried her about her pledge to bring freedom to Iran. Also interviewed was Maryam Rajavi, president-elect of the NCRI, about her goal to break the spell of repression and herald regime change from within Iran.

Trump, Nikki Haley can punish Iran without ending nuclear deal

Stories behind the Story

In an email sent to his list on Aug. 16, Omri Ceren, senior adviser at the Israel Project, discussed two “buckets” about whether Trump will decertify the Iran deal in October.

While Washington offered hundreds of millions of dollars in new funding for infrastructure projects and related nonmilitary ones, Tehran usedAmerica’s own tactics against it.

Certification

Corker-Cardin is the 2015 legislation establishing congressional oversight over the Iran deal. There also is a draft UNSC Resolution Amb. Haley said Iran has been violating.

Trump is required to recertify the deal every 90 days. The next deadline is October 15. Trump also needs to decide soon whether to keep extending sanctions relief to Iran. President Obama first began the process of waiving the sanctions in mid-January, and President Trump reluctantly continued to do so in May, 2017.

Trump might decertify Iran but still waive sanctions, which places the onus on Congress to have the final word. In his email, Ceren discussed this new argument with several Trump administration officials.

Citing Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Ceren emailed his list:

“There may have been a debate over whether or not the resolution counts but now, ‘…case closed.’

“The president would be openly lying to Congress if he certified that Iran met the Corker-Cardin requirements.

“Amb. Haley sets ‘the predicate’ for the president to decertify and roll out a ‘pressure and fix’ campaign while signaling to Congress that now may not be the opportune time to reinstate sanctions and take America out of the deal.”

Human Rights Violations & Review of Iran Policy

To move forward, first, penalize Iran with new sanctions on ballistic missile production, testing, and proliferation, as well as state-sponsored terrorism and human rights violations. In 1988, Tehran executed up to 30,000 political prisoners, and tried to hide their bodies. Most of them were NCRI members.

Second, Amb. Haley should state at the UN that these human rights violations are a part of Iran’s ignoble history. Trump’s tasking of his National Security Council staff to review Iran policy should take into account such human rights violations by Tehran.

Third, Trump’s review of Iran policy should take into account Tehran’s reactions to NCRI revelations of human rights violations.

Keep in mind, the louder Tehran screams, the more likely it is the regime is duplicitous.

Dr. Raymond Tanter, @Americanchr, served on the senior staff of the Reagan National Security Council from 1981-82 and was personal representative of the Secretary of Defense to security talks in Europe, 1983-84. Tanter is currently a professor emeritus at the University of Michigan.

Iran’s opposition shows how to run an election

Ms. Merrikhi and Ms. Akhyani (previous Secretary General)

Dr. Majid Rafizadeh

Arab News, 11 September 2017 - Proponents of the Iranian government argue that there exist no better alternatives to the political establishment of the ruling clerics. The reality is, though, that there are indeed alternative establishments — ones that are organized and democratic. As Iran finds itself engulfed in domestic and external turmoil, the opposition-in-exile has shown that it enjoys a tremendous amount of prowess and cohesion and upholds democracy and democratic values.
Tehran continues to face challenges to expand its influence in the region by brute force. Against this backdrop, the time to support Iran’s opposition has come. A new administration in Washington has been ramping up the heat, punishing Tehran for meddling in other states’ affairs and advancing its ballistic missile drive. All the while Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has seen his representative rejected by two senior Shiite leaders in Iraq, the proxy war in Yemen going south and Tehran’s support for maintaining Syria’s Bashar Assad in power eating up crucial resources.

Internally, the Iranian people are stepping up their protests to significant levels. In now daily protests, thousands of investors are demanding their savings from state-run institutions, and there were clashes recently in the city of Baneh in western Iran when people took up arms to protest against the ruthless killing of porters by state security forces.
In a significant parallel development, the principal Iranian opposition People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) held its congress last Wednesday, its 52nd anniversary, and elected a new secretary general.

On the PMOI's 52nd anniversary, the Congress elected Ms. Zahra Merrikhi as its new Secretary General

A fair and inclusive election is a core principle of a democratic organization. This election took place in six cities in six countries, including Tirana, the Albanian capital, where most MEK members are stationed after their long ordeal in Iraq. Zahra Merrikhi was elected as the new secretary general, replacing Zohreh Akhiyani, who served from 2011. In view of its unique nature and differences from state or party elections, MEK rules and regulations stipulate that the election of a secretary general takes place in three different assemblies.
In the first such assembly on Aug. 20, an initial 12 candidates were introduced, of whom four reached the next stage, with Merrikhi receiving a majority of the votes. At the second assembly two weeks later, senior MEK officials and cadres cast their ballots for the final four candidates, with Merrikhi leading the vote tally again. At the third and final assembly last Wednesday, all members raised their hands and unanimously elected Merrikhi.

After Her Election as PMOI/MEK Secretary General, Zahra Merrikhi Pledges toBring Freedom

Born in 1959, she joined the MEK in the years leading up to the 1979 revolution. She was summoned and interrogated several times by the Shah’s intelligence service for her activities. Her younger brother, Ali, was killed by the current Iranian regime in 1988. From 2003 onward she was the coordinator of the office representing Iranian opposition leader Maryam Rajavi, President of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a coalition of opposition groups.

“Unlike the sclerotic theocracy currently in power in Tehran, its opponents represent youth, dynamism and gender equality.”

Dr. Majid Rafizadeh

Opposition Elect New Secretary General

The Democratic approach adopted by the opposition in this election process is in stark contrast to the one imposed on its compatriots by the regime ruling Iran for the past four decades. It also undercuts the oft-repeated, regime inspired characterization that the opposition has an authoritarian structure.
If we were to take the Iranian regime’s presidential “election” into consideration, we would view a selection by an unelected few, far from anything resembling an election in the 21st century.
Iran’s so-called presidential elections, which banned all women, is a procedure in which all candidates are vetted by 12 ultraconservative clerics and so-called legal experts, named the Guardian Council, who are directly and indirectly appointed by the Supreme Leader. All candidates are evaluated for their utter devotion and obedience to the clerical regime and Supreme Leader.
As the Tehran regime’s founding fathers die one after the other, and the health of Khamenei himself is in question, there are serious doubts about the future of his rule and the regime in its entirety.
The conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi said to be groomed by Khamenei to reach the presidency and eventually succeed him, failed to unseat Hassan Rouhani from the presidency, so there is no new face with the necessary majority support to lead this regime into its unknown future. It is a completely different story for the MEK leadership, however, as Merrikhi enjoys the support of 18 senior colleagues and three from the organization’s younger generation. Narges Azodanlou, 36, Rabi’eh Mofidi, 35, and Nasrin Massih, 39, all born during or after the 1979 revolution, show how the MEK is able to adapt and deliver new and dynamic young leaders in this fast-changing world.
In short, Iran’s opposition election demonstrates process, structure, depth of leadership ranks and a genuine and practical commitment to gender equality, especially in leadership positions.

“Today, the PMOI, with the help of the Iranian people, is prepared as never before to overthrow the clerical regime,” Merrikhi said after expressing gratitude to her predecessors and vowing to remain loyal to the ultimate objective of establishing freedom and democracy in Iran.

Welcoming her election, NCRI President-elect Rajavi described this new development as signaling the soon-to-come change of the theocracy ruling Iran.

Maryam Rajavi: This election will break the spell of repression and heralds the overthrow of

The critical time has come to robustly support other Iranian democratic establishments, which oppose Iran’s ruling clerics, the IRGC, its sectarian agenda and Tehran’s hegemonic ambitions. Standing with Iran’s opposition would be a strong blow to Iran’s leaders, who fear the soft power of the opposition more than the hard power of foreign nations.

• Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian-American political scientist. He is a leading expert on Iran and US foreign policy, a businessman, and president of the International American Council. Twitter: @Dr_Rafizadeh

The Iran Deal Is on Thin Ice, and Rightly So

Map of Iran

The Trump administration has a compelling case that Iran’s regional conduct makes the JCPOA no longer sacrosanct

BY JAMES JEFFREY
Foreign Policy, SEPTEMBER 8, 2017 - The future of the Iran deal is again under question. President Donald Trump garnered much attention in July by stating he no longer wanted to certify that Iran is in compliance with the agreement, which is required by law to occur every 90 days and thus due again next month. European leaders reacted by affirming their support for the deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and the Iranian government responded by claiming that it was in compliance — but would take measures to accelerate its nuclear program if Washington were to stop its compliance. Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certified Iran’s compliance again in June, weakening the president’s case.

But given the extraordinary threat that Iran poses with its expansionism in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere, as well as the ongoing administration review of Iran policy, the status of the JCPOA cannot be sacrosanct.

It’s clear that those within Trump’s orbit are already thinking hard about the best way to remake U.S. policy toward Iran. Former Ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton recently published a detailed “game plan” for pulling out of the agreement and adopting a course of political pressure on Iran amounting almost to regime change. And this week, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley laid out the case for Iran’s noncompliance in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), without endorsing a specific action by the administration.

The Trump administration, Haley noted, sees the agreement as flawed because it is time-limited, front-loaded in Iran’s favor, and does not end enrichment. Thus, it does not totally exclude Iran’s path to the accumulation of sufficient fissile material for a nuclear device. Moreover, it does not effectively address prior nuclear weaponization efforts, which were left to an opaque side deal between the IAEA and Iran, which now blocks inspections of military facilities.

But a primary problem with the agreement, in Haley’s view, is that it does nothing to curb Iran’s aggressive regional expansionism. This behavior, which profoundly worries every friendly Middle East leader, kicked into high gear just weeks after the JCPOA was signed in 2015. International agreements, particularly concerning weapons of mass destruction, are obviously important in themselves, but their strategic context should not be ignored. For example, while there has been little genuine angst over the Israeli nuclear weapons program, regional and global concern about Iranian nukes has been profound due to its destabilizing regional policies.

The Obama administration’s behavior stoked Iran’s aggressive regional approach. U.S. officials in the previous administration were slippery on the issue of “linkage” between the agreement and Iran’s disruptive regional agenda. At times, such as a speech Vice President Joseph Biden made at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in April 2015, officials argued that the agreement was simply concerned with nuclear restraints, and Iran’s regional behavior would be dealt with in other ways. But it never was — not in Syria, Yemen, or elsewhere. Rather, the administration’s implicit position appeared best reflected in President Barack Obama’s 2015 interview with the Atlantic, wherein he argued that the long game engendered by the agreement would help return Iran to respectability and calm the region, while also signaling that he was not overly troubled by Iran’s deprivations. He opined that Saudi Arabia had to find a way to “share the neighborhood” with Iran, and that backing U.S. allies in the region too strongly against Iran would only fan the flames of conflict.

But Iran’s behavior is now too dangerous to ignore. Tehran has facilitated Bashar Al-Assad's scorched-earth policy, encouraged Russia to intervene in Syria, and abetted the rise of the Islamic State by allowing Assad and its clients in Iraq to oppress Sunni Arabs to the point of embracing the jihadist organization. While the JCPOA itself did not enable Iran’s regional policies or finance its expeditionary campaigns — which were well-funded before 2015 — the agreement encouraged Iran’s behavior. Certainly its huge arms purchases from Russia would not have been possible under the oil export and foreign deposit sanctions, and the agreement gave Iran a “seal of approval” facilitating its aggressiveness.

Leveraging the Iran deal to pressure Tehran, or even negotiating a more restrictive agreement, may look at first blush like mission impossible. Despite the nibbling at the edges described above, there is as yet no serious Iranian JCPOA violation. Under these conditions, as Richard Nephew and Ian Goldberg argue in Foreign Policy, there is little likelihood that the United States could convince the agreement’s other signatories and third parties to again implement U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil exports, which brought Iran to the negotiating table last time.

While this fact seemingly argues for leaving the agreement alone, there are other considerations that the administration must take into account. This includes a looming crisis in the Middle East: The Iranian-Assad-Russian campaign for dominance in Syria, and the American-led Coalition campaign to destroy the Islamic State, are both coming to a close. This leaves the United States and its partners with the choice of pulling out of enclaves in Syria and northern Iraq, which were established to fight the Islamic State but useful to counter the Iranian alliance, or if not, face possible direct military confrontation with Iran and its surrogates in both countries, as they see these enclaves as obstacles to Iranian domination of the Levant. Under such circumstances, no aspect of Iranian relations, including the JCPOA, can be immune from a re-think.

The United States can take measures here short of a full-scale JCPOA annulment — which, given the difficulties imposing international sanctions, would likely be a diplomatic disaster. European allies, for example, recently joined the United States in challenging an Iranian missile test “in defiance of” U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA. The issue of blocked IAEA access to Iranian military facilities should also be reviewed.

Iran’s expectation of commercial benefits from the JCPOA is also its Achilles’ heel. The administration could discourage global firms from doing business with Iran by leaving open its final position on the deal, and thus be placed at risk their business with America. This is a technical violation of the JCPOA’s terms, but of the most unrealistic condition — the commitment to support Iranian economic development. While such actions would disappoint Iran, they are unlikely to drive Tehran from an otherwise beneficial agreement.

Furthermore, as Haley signaled in her AEI remarks, the law passed by the U.S. Congress requiring the president to certify that Iran is abiding by the Iran deal defines “compliance” more broadly than the JCPOA terms does. In contrast to the Iran deal, the president is required to certify that sanctions relief is in the vital national security interests of the U.S. The president thus could hold Iran in “non-compliance” under that act without necessarily stopping — or allowing Congress to stop — American compliance with the terms of the JCPOA. Under JCPOA Paragraph 36, the United States could also reinstitute token or partial sanctions in response to Iranian actions without pulling out of the agreement.

To many in the international community — especially Europe, but less so in the countries closer to Iran — such steps are anathema. But few if any countries really consider preserving the JCPOA their overriding interest in the Middle East: Even in Europe, what really impacts populations is threats from the Islamic State and unchecked refugee flows, which are largely a result of Iran’s policies in Syria. Moreover, a possible collapse of the U.S.-led Middle East security system by an unchecked Iran endangers them more than it does the United States.

No matter what Trump or another president does, the Iran deal is poised to run up against an uncomfortable political reality. Under the JCPOA, Congress must formally terminate sanctions — which until now have only been waived by the executive branch – by January 2024. It defies credulity to think that anything like today’s Congress, given anything like Iran’s current behavior, would take such a step by 2024. But not doing so would violate a key JCPOA provision and block Iranian formal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Additional Protocol. Under these conditions, it may be feasible to pressure those in the international community favorable to the JCPOA to rethink overall relations with Iran, as the “price” for salvaging the agreement’s nuclear restraints.

Ms. Zahra Merrikhi Pledges to Bring Freedom to Iran After her Election as PMOI/MEK Secretary General

On the PMOIs 52nd anniversary, the Congress elected Ms. Zahra Merrikhi as its new Secretary General. Ms. Zohreh Akhyani .

PARIS, Wall Street Online, September 7, 2017 -- The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, PMOI, (the Mujahedin-e Khalq, MEK) held its annual Congress simultaneously in Tirana and five other countries. On the PMOI's 52nd anniversary, the Congress elected Ms. Zahra Merrikhi as its new Secretary General. Ms. Zohreh Akhyani, the Secretary General since 2011, chaired the Congress. According to the PMOI's bylaws, the Secretary General is elected to a renewable term of two years. The election is held in three phases. In the first phase, members of the PMOI Central Council, and in the second the organization's officials and cadres in different departments, cast their votes in secret ballots. In the third phase, at the PMOI Congress, all members vote by raising their hands. In the first phase, on August 20, 2017, Ms. Merrikhi was elected from among 12 candidates by a majority of the Central Council members. The four leading candidates were put on the ballot for the second phase, which was held on September 3, 2017. Ms. Merrikhi received a majority of the votes cast in ten different PMOI centers. In the final phase, during the PMOI Congress, Ms. Merrikhi was unanimously elected Secretary General. Previously, Ms. Merrikhi was coordinator for the offices of Mrs. Maryam Rajavi , the President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran ( NCRI ), and Vice-President of the PMOI's Central Council. Born in 1959 in the city of Qa'emshahr in the northern Province of Mazandaran, Ms. Merrikhi became acquainted with the PMOI during the 1979 anti-Monarchic Revolution and joined the PMOI after the Shah's overthrow. She was soon appointed head of the women's section in Qa'emshahr, and later became a member of the editorial board of the PMOI publication in Mazandaran, called Talavang. 1981, she was transferred to Tehran and acted as liaison between the PMOI and its branches in the forests of northern Iran. In 1984, she moved to PMOI bases in the border region with Iraq, and a year later became a member of the Central Council. Her younger brother, Ali Merrikhi, was murdered by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in 1988. Ms. Merrikhi oversaw PMOI branches in Scandinavia and Germany for some time. In 1991, she became a member of the Executive Committee and was later appointed head of Radio Mojahed, Simay-e Moghavemat (the Iranian Resistance's television network) and the publication Mojahed. She became a member of the NCRI in 1992 and was appointed Chairwoman of the Public Affairs Committee. Ms. Merrikhi had been the coordinator of the offices of Mrs. Rajavi since 2003 and the Vice-president of the PMOI's Central Council since 2004. Following her election as Secretary General, Mrs. Merrikhi was sworn in, placing her hand on the Holy Quran and paying her respects to the Iranian flag and PMOI emblem. She pledged to remain faithful to the enormous responsibilities with which she has been entrusted. Ms. Merrikhi vowed to devote all her abilities and those of the PMOI as a national treasure of the Iranian people, to establish freedom and democracy in Iran. The new Secretary General expressed her appreciation for the efforts of her predecessor, Ms. Akhyani, and Ms. Mojgan Parsai, the President of the PMOI's Central Council. She lauded their efforts and those of other PMOI officials over the past 14 years, during one of the most dangerous and tortuous periods of the Organizations history in camps Ashraf and Liberty. 'Today, the PMOI, with the help of the Iranian people, is prepared as never before to overthrow the clerical regime,' Ms. Merrikhi said, adding that the PMOI has now 18 co-Secretaries General (including seven former Secretaries General). Ms. Merrikhi also introduced Narges Azodanlou, 36, Rabi'eh Mofidi, 35, and Nasrin Massih, 39, as new deputies to the Secretary General. In congratulating the election of Ms. Merrikhi as the new PMOI Secretary General, Mrs. Rajavi described it as a brilliant election, embodying the height of democracy, cohesion, and growth in the PMOI. It heralds the breaking of the spell of repression which will lead to the overthrow of the regime ruling Iran, she added.

North Korea’s Hwasong-12 Launch: A Disturbing Developmen

Hwasong-12 ballistic missile

BY: MICHAEL ELLEMAN

38 NORTH, August, 31, 2017--While North Korea’s missile test on August 28, reportedly of the intermediate range Hwasong-12 (KN-17), broke up into three pieces during flight only flying 2,700 kilometers—far short of its 4,000 kilometer range—the launch was a disturbing development in Pyongyang’s continuing program to develop long-range missiles.

Why Fly Over Japan?

The test launch had two primary objectives. First, Kim Jong Un likely sought to take measure of the international community’s response to the overflight of Japanese territory. Though North Korea twice before attempted to launch a satellite using a flight path that passed over Japan, the Hwasong-12 is the first ballistic missile to overfly the island nation. If the US response to the test firing is judged to be mild by Pyongyang, North Korea may feel that future flights will be similarly accepted by Washington and its regional allies.

The Hwasong-12 (pictured) is an intermediate-range ballistic missile with a shorter range than the Taepodong inter-continental ballistic missile the North is trying to develop

Second, the flight was likely intended to evaluate the missile’s performance and reliability under operational conditions. Before the Hwasong-12 and the intercontinental range Hwasong-14 can be deployed, engineers must demonstrate that they work reliably when flown to maximum range. To date, the two missiles have been launched on steep flight paths that reach high altitudes, ensuring that the mock warheads land in the sea just short of Japan. Much can be learned from the tests, but full-range flights replicating the conditions a combat-capable missile would experience are needed. This flight begins to address that requirement.

Is North Korea Testing a Post-Boost Vehicle (PBV)?

The most recent Hwasong-12 flight ended with the mock warhead landing in the Pacific Ocean about 2,700 km from the launch site, well short of its maximum range. North Korean engineers may have shut the Hwasong-12’s engine down early, resulting in a shorter flight. Turning off the engine roughly five seconds early would yield a range and apogee matching the reported values. Or the payload mass of the first test may have been considerably lighter than that of North Korea’s nuclear warhead, allowing the missile to achieve a much higher altitude, thus exaggerating the derived maximum range when the missile is flown on a standard flight path. For example, if the May flight carried a payload of 250 kg, and the most recent test fitted the Hwasong-12 with a 1,250-kg package, the range is reduced to about 2,700 km, with a peak altitude of roughly 550 km. Finally, the Hwasong-12 may have been flown on a non-optimal trajectory, one that was steeper or flatter than a normal flight path employed to maximize achievable range. However, the reported apogee of the Hwasong-12 flight is inconsistent with this explanation.

The Hwasong-12 (pictured) is an intermediate-range ballistic missile

An alternative disturbing hypothesis is that tests of the missile have included a small post-boost vehicle (PBV) to provide extra boost to the payload after the main stage is discarded. The May 14 test of the Hwasong-12 was previously modeled, but could not replicate the flight’s reported apogee and range, without the addition of a small PBV. The increased velocity provided by the PBV allows the payload to reach an apogee of 2,000 km and travel about 700 km in range. The hypothesis is consistent with observations made by others, including Norbert Brugge, who identified the existence of fuelling ports located just under the Hwasong-12’s reentry vehicle.

There are logical reasons for employing a PBV. In addition to boosting range, it can be used to make fine adjustments to payload’s velocity after engine shut-down. ICBMs fielded by the US, Russia, France and China all employ PBVs to achieve better accuracy. PBVs also provide a platform to carry a warhead, plus lightweight decoys or other penetration aids capable of impairing effectiveness against missile defensmoes.

The presence of a PBV on the Hwasong-12 is just a hypothesis for now, although reports that the missile “broke into three pieces” are consistent with PBV engine failure. As the PBV separates from the main booster, its engine should activate and accelerate the reentry vehicle to the pre-defined velocity. If the PBV’s engine fails to initiate, and the reentry vehicle separates from the PBV, all three components (main booster, PBV and warhead) follow an approximately similar trajectory. To a distant radar, the missile appears to separate into three disparate pieces at the end of boost for no obvious reason. Without the added velocity provided by a properly functioning PBV, the reentry vehicle along with the main stage and PBV, land in the ocean 2,700 km from the launch site—well short of the missile’s maximum range. In other words, the dead weight of the non-functioning PBV, if it was fully fuelled, is equivalent to launching the missile with a 1,200 to 1,300 kg payload, as described above.

While it is impossible to know with certainty why the most recent test flew only 2,700 km, if it was the result of a failed PBV, its use on North Korea’s long-range missiles is ominous. It is another sign that Pyongyang is deadly serious about developing and fielding nuclear-tipped missiles capable of striking the US mainland, and critical US military bases in the Pacific Ocean. North Korea has much work remaining—perhaps a year or two—before it matures the technologies and systems needed to credibly threaten the US.